The strategic map of the Middle East is beginning to change again. After decades of maintaining a large military and diplomatic presence across the region, the United States is signaling that it may be ready to reduce at least part of its military footprint once the war with Iran comes to an end. At the same time, Turkey is positioning itself for a larger role in regional security, diplomacy and defence cooperation. Ankara is not simply waiting for an American withdrawal. It is building relationships, strengthening its defence industry and creating new security arrangements that could give it greater influence across a region where the traditional balance of power has been disrupted.

The shift does not mean that the United States is leaving the Middle East, nor does it mean that Turkey is preparing to replace Washington as the region's dominant military power. The emerging picture is more complicated. Washington appears to be considering a smaller and potentially more selective presence, while Turkey is attempting to increase its influence through regional partnerships, military cooperation, mediation and defence exports. The result could be a Middle East where several regional powers assume greater responsibility for security while the United States retains important bases, intelligence relationships, diplomatic influence and military capabilities.

The issue has become more significant following the war with Iran, which has exposed vulnerabilities in the American military infrastructure across the region. The Washington Post reported in August that the Pentagon was evaluating whether to reduce the US military presence in the Persian Gulf after the conflict, including considering whether some damaged bases should be rebuilt at their previous scale. The report emphasized that the assessment was not yet a formal decision, but it demonstrated that Washington was examining the future structure of its regional deployment.

Separate reporting by CNN in September described discussions among military and intelligence officials about reducing the number of US personnel and facilities in the Middle East if the Trump administration succeeds in ending the Iran conflict. According to CNN, the discussions were taking place even while tens of thousands of American personnel remained deployed across the region. The US military was simultaneously considering how to protect the forces that would remain, including potential changes to the location and hardening of military installations.

That distinction is important. A smaller American footprint does not necessarily mean American disengagement. The United States could reduce the number of permanent troops while retaining air power, naval capabilities, intelligence assets, diplomatic relationships and the ability to rapidly deploy forces when required. Washington could also continue supplying weapons and security assistance to regional partners. The question is therefore not simply whether America will leave, but what kind of presence it intends to maintain.

For Turkey, that uncertainty creates both an opportunity and a challenge. Ankara has long sought greater strategic autonomy while remaining a member of NATO. It occupies a unique geographical position connecting Europe, the Black Sea, the Caucasus and the Middle East. It borders Syria and Iraq and shares a frontier with Iran. It also controls the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, the waterways connecting the Black Sea with the Mediterranean. These geographical advantages give Turkey interests in almost every major security issue affecting the region.

Turkey's ambitions have become more visible since the beginning of the Iran conflict. The Washington Post reported in May that Ankara was advocating what Turkish officials described as "regional ownership", arguing that countries in the region should play a greater role in addressing their own security problems. Turkey also held discussions with Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Egypt about new security partnerships.

That approach has now produced a concrete institutional development. On August 7, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan signed the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement. According to Turkey's Directorate of Communications, the agreement states that an armed attack against any one of the three countries would be regarded as an attack against all three and provides for broader defence cooperation.

The agreement is significant because it brings together three countries with very different strategic capabilities. Saudi Arabia possesses enormous energy resources and financial capacity. Pakistan has a large military and nuclear weapons capability. Turkey has a substantial conventional military and an increasingly sophisticated domestic defence industry. The agreement does not create a NATO-style alliance in all respects, but it establishes a framework for collective defence and cooperation among the three countries.

The arrangement is already being institutionalized. On August 31, Turkish, Saudi and Pakistani foreign and defence officials and military chiefs met in Istanbul under the framework of the Makkah Agreement. Their joint statement said the three countries would establish a secretariat in Saudi Arabia and strengthen cooperation in defence industries, joint technology development and production.

The military relationship has continued to develop. On September 25, military chiefs from the three countries met in Riyadh to discuss intelligence sharing, military coordination and integration of capabilities. Reuters reported that the discussions included regional security concerns and followed the signing of the Makkah agreement the previous month.

Yet Turkey's ambitions are not limited to formal defence agreements. Ankara has increasingly used mediation as another instrument of influence. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has sought to maintain dialogue with different sides in several international conflicts, while Turkish officials have presented their country as a state capable of communicating with actors that often have limited channels with one another.

This diplomatic flexibility is one of Turkey's distinctive assets. Ankara is a NATO member and maintains close defence relationships with Western countries, but it has also maintained relationships with Russia, Qatar and other states that do not always share Washington's priorities. Turkey has its own disagreements with Israel and Iran, while simultaneously needing to maintain working relationships with both regional and global powers.

The country's position in Syria is particularly important. The fall of Bashar al-Assad's government fundamentally changed the regional balance and expanded the importance of Turkey's relationship with the new Syrian political and security structures. Turkey has significant interests in northern Syria, including border security, refugee policy, Kurdish armed groups and economic reconstruction.

As Washington reduces its role in parts of Syria, Turkey has greater room to influence developments there. But this does not mean that Ankara can simply control the country's future. Syria remains a complicated environment involving multiple local actors, neighbouring states, Russia, Israel, Iran and international institutions. Turkey's influence is substantial, but it operates within a crowded strategic environment.

The United States also has interests that are unlikely to disappear simply because troop numbers decline. Washington has an established relationship with the Syrian Democratic Forces in the fight against Islamic State, although that relationship has long been a source of tension with Ankara. Turkey regards the Kurdish People's Protection Units, or YPG, as connected to the Kurdistan Workers' Party, which Turkey and several Western governments designate as a terrorist organization. The United States has historically distinguished between the two and cooperated with the YPG-linked SDF against Islamic State.

A US drawdown could therefore create new questions about the future of this relationship. Turkey could gain more room to influence security arrangements along its southern border, but Washington would still have an interest in preventing the resurgence of Islamic State and protecting broader regional stability.

The issue is particularly sensitive because Turkey's ambitions could intersect with Israel's expanding regional military role. The two countries have increasingly tense relations, particularly over Gaza and the wider regional conflict. The Washington Post reported in May that Turkish officials were concerned about Israel's growing military power and the possibility of a direct strategic rivalry between Ankara and Jerusalem.

This creates a complicated triangle. If the United States reduces its military footprint while Israel remains militarily active and Turkey becomes more influential, the regional balance could shift in ways that Washington itself may not fully control. Turkey does not necessarily want confrontation with Israel, and Turkish officials have publicly indicated that they do not seek a direct military conflict. But Ankara is clearly paying closer attention to Israel's regional role.

The challenge for Turkey is that greater influence brings greater responsibility. If Ankara wants to become a more important regional security actor, it will face expectations to contribute to deterrence, crisis management and defence cooperation. That is considerably more demanding than acting as a diplomatic intermediary.

Turkey's defence industry is one reason Ankara believes it has more tools available than it did a decade ago. Turkish defence exports have grown rapidly. Reuters reported in June that Turkey's defence exports had reached approximately $10 billion in 2025, more than three times their 2021 level. Turkish companies now supply military equipment to nearly 40 countries, with drones among the most prominent products.

The expansion has continued into 2026. Turkey's Defence Industries Presidency said in July that defence and aerospace exports exceeded $11 billion on a rolling 12-month basis for the first time. Exports during the first six months of 2026 reached $4.67 billion, according to figures cited by Anadolu Agency.

This matters strategically because defence exports create relationships that extend beyond commercial transactions. A country purchasing drones, armoured vehicles, naval platforms, missiles or air-defence systems from Turkey may also develop training, maintenance, intelligence and technology relationships with Ankara. Over time, those relationships can translate into diplomatic influence.

Turkey's drones have become particularly important to its international profile. Turkish unmanned systems have been used in conflicts from Libya to Ukraine and have attracted buyers in the Gulf, Africa, Asia and Europe. Their appeal is partly linked to cost and availability, but their operational experience has also contributed to Turkey's reputation as a defence technology producer.

This gives Ankara an additional tool at a moment when many countries are reassessing their dependence on major external security providers. Gulf states, in particular, have spent decades relying heavily on American military protection while also investing in their own defence capabilities. The Iran war has intensified questions about how much protection external powers can provide and how quickly they can respond to attacks.

The Makkah defence agreement can be understood partly within this context. Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan are creating a framework for closer cooperation at a time when Gulf security is under intense pressure. The agreement does not necessarily replace American security guarantees, but it gives its participants another layer of strategic coordination.

That distinction is important. Saudi Arabia remains deeply connected to the United States through defence contracts, investment, energy markets and diplomatic relationships. Pakistan also has a long history of military ties with Washington. Turkey is a NATO member. The three countries are therefore not constructing an alternative system that exists completely outside the Western security architecture.

Instead, they appear to be pursuing greater regional capacity while maintaining relationships with major global powers. This approach could become increasingly common across the Middle East. Governments that once relied primarily on one major external security provider may seek relationships with several powers simultaneously.

For Turkey, this is also about geography. The country cannot isolate itself from conflicts in Syria, Iraq or Iran. Developments in the Gulf can affect Turkish energy supplies and trade. Instability in Syria can affect Turkey's border security. Conflict in the Caucasus can affect Turkish interests in Azerbaijan and Central Asia. The Middle East is therefore not a distant theatre for Ankara.

Turkey's economic interests also matter. The country has struggled with inflation and currency weakness in recent years, which limits its ability to sustain expensive foreign military commitments. Greater regional influence therefore has to be balanced against economic realities.

NPR reported on September 27 that Turkey's economic difficulties, including high inflation and a weak currency, could constrain its ambitions even as its military and strategic influence grows. The report cited analysts who argued that Turkey has increased its regional influence but has not yet demonstrated that it can translate that influence into a broader Turkish-led regional order.

This is perhaps the most important limitation on the idea that Turkey is simply preparing to replace the United States. Military capability is only one component of regional power. Economic strength, diplomatic credibility, technological capacity, alliances, political stability and the ability to sustain commitments over many years all matter.

Turkey has significant advantages, but it does not possess the financial resources of the United States or the Gulf monarchies. It also does not have the same global military reach as Washington. Its armed forces are powerful within the regional context, but projecting and sustaining military power across multiple theatres would be costly.

Ankara is therefore more likely to pursue influence through partnerships rather than attempt to replicate the American model. Defence agreements, arms sales, training, intelligence cooperation and diplomatic mediation can produce strategic influence without requiring Turkey to station large numbers of troops across the region.

The decision by Turkey to avoid direct military intervention in Yemen under the Makkah framework illustrates this approach. Al-Monitor reported in September that Ankara planned to strengthen Saudi Arabia's defence capabilities through joint planning, military training and intelligence sharing but would not directly intervene in the conflict between Saudi-backed forces and the Houthis.

That restraint is strategically significant. A regional power seeking greater influence does not necessarily need to fight every conflict. Turkey can expand its role by helping partners strengthen their own capabilities while avoiding the costs and risks of becoming a direct combatant.

The same principle could apply elsewhere. Turkey can provide drones and other defence systems without deploying large formations. It can facilitate negotiations without guaranteeing the outcome. It can participate in regional security structures without assuming responsibility for every threat.

The United States, meanwhile, may be trying to redefine its own role rather than abandoning the region altogether. The costs of maintaining large permanent bases have become more visible following attacks during the Iran war. The Washington Post reported that the Pentagon was considering whether damaged bases should be rebuilt and at what scale.

The financial dimension is important. The Pentagon estimated that the Iran war could cost approximately $37.5 billion by the end of September, while the cost of rebuilding damaged facilities would come separately. The possibility of spending billions simply to restore bases to their previous configuration creates an obvious policy question: whether the United States should rebuild the same footprint or use the opportunity to develop a different force posture.

The answer will depend on how Washington defines its interests. If the United States believes it needs the ability to rapidly respond to threats against Israel, Gulf partners, shipping lanes and energy infrastructure, it may retain substantial capabilities. If policymakers place greater emphasis on avoiding large regional deployments, they may prefer offshore naval power, long-range aircraft, intelligence networks and smaller forward bases.

A smaller footprint could therefore coexist with significant American military power. Aircraft carriers, strategic bombers, drones, intelligence platforms and precision weapons can project power without requiring the same number of permanent troops stationed across the region.

This is where Turkey's emergence becomes particularly interesting. A more selective US military presence could encourage regional countries to strengthen their own capabilities, but it could also create competitive pressures. Saudi Arabia may deepen cooperation with Turkey and Pakistan. Israel may seek additional defence partnerships. Iran will continue to rely on its own military capabilities and regional relationships. Gulf states may diversify their security relationships with Europe and Asian powers.

The Middle East could therefore become more multipolar rather than simply becoming a Turkish sphere of influence.

This multipolarity carries both potential benefits and risks. More regional responsibility could mean that Middle Eastern states have greater control over their own security arrangements. It could also encourage countries to communicate directly with one another rather than waiting for Washington to mediate every dispute.

But more actors with significant military capabilities can also make the strategic environment more complicated. If several countries build competing security arrangements, a local dispute could involve multiple partners. Miscalculations could become harder to contain. Different defence commitments could create uncertainty about who would respond in a crisis.

The Makkah Agreement itself demonstrates both sides of this equation. It provides a formal commitment that an armed attack against one member will be treated as an attack against all. Such language can strengthen deterrence, but it can also create questions about how the agreement would operate if one member became involved in a conflict that another member did not consider directly related to its own security.

The practical meaning of the agreement will depend on implementation. The August 31 statement's emphasis on joint planning, defence industry cooperation, technology development and institutional structures suggests that the participants are trying to build mechanisms rather than rely solely on political declarations.

Turkey's relationship with the United States will remain another crucial variable. Despite disagreements, Ankara and Washington remain NATO allies. Erdogan said in September that conflicts and crises around the world require Turkey and the United States to remain in close dialogue and called for new momentum in bilateral relations.

This means that Turkish regional ambitions should not automatically be interpreted as anti-American. Ankara can simultaneously seek greater regional autonomy and maintain its NATO relationship. In fact, Turkey's NATO membership strengthens its strategic position because it gives the country access to Western military technology, intelligence networks and political relationships.

The relationship remains complicated by longstanding disputes. Turkey's purchase of the Russian S-400 air defence system resulted in its removal from the US F-35 programme. Differences over Syria, Kurdish forces, Gaza and relations with Russia have periodically strained bilateral ties. Yet both countries have continued to cooperate in areas where their interests overlap.

A smaller US presence could therefore produce two possible outcomes in Turkish-American relations. Washington may see Turkey as an increasingly valuable regional partner capable of carrying more responsibility. Alternatively, US policymakers could become more concerned that Ankara's independent regional policies do not always align with American objectives.

Both dynamics could exist simultaneously.

Turkey also faces competition from other regional powers. Saudi Arabia has been pursuing its own foreign-policy diversification and has improved relations with countries including Iran and China while maintaining its long-standing relationship with Washington. Qatar has considerable diplomatic influence. The United Arab Emirates has developed extensive economic and security relationships across the region and beyond. Egypt remains important because of its population, military capabilities and control of the Suez Canal.

Turkey therefore enters the emerging regional order as one important actor among several. Its influence may increase, but it will have to negotiate with other states that have their own ambitions.

Iran remains another central variable. The weakening of Iran's regional position during the conflict could create additional space for Turkey, particularly in Syria and Iraq. But Iran remains geographically important and retains its own military and political networks. Any Turkish strategy that ignores Iran's interests would carry significant risks.

Iraq is particularly important because the United States is completing the withdrawal of its remaining troops from the country by September 30, 2026. Reuters reported that the departure ends a military presence that began with the 2003 invasion. The withdrawal is expected to create new strategic questions for Iraq as it balances relations with Washington, Tehran and other regional powers.

For Turkey, Iraq is not simply another Middle Eastern country. It is a neighbour with significant trade, energy and security implications. Ankara has conducted operations against Kurdish militants in northern Iraq and maintains extensive economic ties with the country. Greater American disengagement could therefore give Turkey additional room to shape security developments along its southern frontier.

At the same time, Turkey will have to consider the possibility of an Islamic State resurgence. Reuters reported that analysts were concerned about the potential for militant groups to exploit security gaps following the US withdrawal from Iraq.

This illustrates why a US reduction does not automatically translate into Turkish freedom of action. Security vacuums can create problems for every neighbouring state. Turkey may gain influence, but it may also inherit more responsibility for instability that previously received greater American attention.

The same problem exists in Syria. If Washington reduces its presence, Turkey could have greater influence over northern Syria, but it could also face increased pressure to prevent militant groups from exploiting the transition. Managing relations with Damascus, Kurdish forces, Russia and other actors would remain complicated.

The emerging situation therefore represents less of a straightforward American exit and more of a redistribution of responsibility.

For the Gulf states, Turkey's role could be particularly useful because Ankara can provide defence technology and military cooperation without demanding the same kind of political alignment that Washington sometimes expects from its partners. Turkish systems can also be delivered relatively quickly, an advantage that has contributed to the growth of the country's defence exports. Reuters reported that Turkish defence exports have expanded rapidly and now reach a wide range of countries.

But Gulf governments are unlikely to abandon their American security relationships simply because Turkey is becoming more influential. The United States remains a major supplier of advanced weapons and a key provider of intelligence and military capabilities. Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states have invested heavily in American defence systems and infrastructure.

Instead, diversification may become the preferred strategy. Gulf countries could seek American weapons, Turkish drones, European systems and other partnerships simultaneously. Such diversification can reduce dependence on a single supplier while increasing bargaining power.

Turkey's defence industry would benefit from that trend, but so would other exporters.

The wider strategic shift also has implications for Europe. Turkey is a NATO member located on Europe's southeastern frontier. European governments are increasingly concerned about defence capacity and supply-chain security. Turkish defence companies have already expanded their exports to Europe, and Ankara wants deeper integration with European defence markets. Reuters reported that Turkey's defence exports to Europe and the United States had grown substantially in recent years.

A stronger Turkish defence industry could therefore have consequences well beyond the Middle East. Turkey could become an increasingly important supplier of drones, ammunition, armoured vehicles and other systems to European and Middle Eastern partners.

This could strengthen Ankara's economic position while also increasing its strategic leverage.

Yet Turkey's rise should not be overstated. Defence exports of around $10 billion or slightly above $11 billion are significant for Turkey, but they remain small compared with the overall scale of American military spending and defence exports. Turkey's armed forces are substantial, but they are not a substitute for the full range of American capabilities.

The more plausible development is that Turkey becomes one of several regional powers capable of shaping outcomes without being able to dominate the entire region.

That distinction matters because the Middle East has rarely operated under the control of one actor for long. The Ottoman Empire, European colonial powers, the United States, the Soviet Union, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Israel and other states have all played different roles at different times. Today's environment is again moving toward a system in which multiple countries possess meaningful but incomplete forms of power.

Turkey's advantage is that it can operate across several of these networks at once. It is part of NATO, maintains relationships with Russia and Middle Eastern states, has an expanding defence industry and occupies a strategically critical location.

The challenge is maintaining balance.

If Turkey becomes too closely identified with one regional bloc, it could lose some of its diplomatic flexibility. If it becomes too assertive militarily, it could intensify competition with Israel, Greece, Iran or other states. If it overextends economically, its domestic financial challenges could limit its ability to sustain regional commitments.

Ankara therefore has incentives to build influence gradually.

The United States faces a different calculation. A smaller footprint could reduce costs and exposure to attacks while encouraging regional allies to develop their own capabilities. But Washington will also have to consider the consequences of reduced deterrence and the possibility that rivals could exploit gaps.

The United States has spent decades building military infrastructure in the Middle East. Changing that structure will not happen overnight. Bases, intelligence networks, defence agreements and logistical arrangements create institutional relationships that can survive changes in troop numbers.

Even if Washington reduces permanent deployments, American aircraft and naval forces could remain capable of returning rapidly if a major crisis develops.

That is why describing the emerging situation as a US withdrawal and Turkish takeover would be misleading. The reality is likely to be more gradual and fragmented.

America may become less physically present while remaining strategically important. Turkey may become more influential without becoming the dominant power. Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states may build stronger regional partnerships while retaining American ties. Israel may continue to rely heavily on its own military capabilities and US support. Iran may seek to rebuild its regional networks. Europe and Asian powers may expand their economic and security relationships.

The resulting Middle East could be more decentralized, with responsibility spread across several countries.

Whether that produces greater stability will depend on how these powers manage their relationships. Regional security arrangements can reduce vulnerability if they encourage communication and collective defence. They can also increase tension if countries begin viewing every rival's partnership as a threat.

Turkey's current strategy appears to emphasize both military capability and diplomacy. The Makkah Agreement gives Ankara a stronger security relationship with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. Defence exports expand its influence. Mediation gives it diplomatic reach. NATO membership preserves a major Western connection. Geography provides direct stakes in Syria, Iraq, Iran and the wider Middle East.

That combination gives Turkey a substantial platform as the regional order evolves.

But influence is not the same as control. Turkey cannot determine the future of Syria by itself. It cannot guarantee Gulf security alone. It cannot replace America's global military infrastructure. And it cannot resolve the region's deepest conflicts through defence agreements alone.

The next few years will therefore be less about one country replacing another and more about how responsibilities are redistributed.

The US decision on the future size of its Middle East footprint will be one of the most consequential variables. The war with Iran has forced Washington to confront the vulnerabilities and costs of its existing military architecture. The Pentagon's discussions about a smaller presence show that the question is being considered seriously, even though no final comprehensive withdrawal plan has been publicly established.

Turkey is already preparing for that possibility.

Its approach is visible in the Makkah defence agreement, the institutionalization of military cooperation with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, the expansion of defence exports and its emphasis on regional diplomacy.

The significance of these developments extends beyond Turkey itself. If the United States ultimately maintains a smaller regional military presence, other Middle Eastern states will have to decide how much responsibility they are willing to assume. Turkey is one of the countries most clearly positioning itself to take on more of that responsibility.

But the final shape of the new order will not be decided in Ankara alone. Washington, Riyadh, Jerusalem, Tehran, Cairo, Doha, Islamabad, Baghdad and Damascus will all influence it.

The Middle East may therefore be entering a period in which regional powers have more room to shape their own security environment. Turkey wants to be one of the principal actors in that process. Its defence industry gives it new tools, its geography gives it strategic importance, and its diplomatic relationships give it access to multiple sides of the regional system.

The United States, meanwhile, appears to be examining whether it can protect its core interests with fewer permanent forces and a different distribution of military power.

That is the central story behind the current shift. It is not simply about American troops leaving or Turkish troops arriving. It is about a broader transition from a Middle East heavily structured around American military presence toward a system in which regional states may assume greater responsibility for security.

Turkey is prepared to play a larger part in that system. Whether it can translate growing military and diplomatic influence into a durable regional role will depend on how carefully Ankara balances ambition with restraint, partnerships with independence, and military capability with diplomacy.

For now, the clearest evidence is that the foundations are already being built. The Makkah defence agreement has created a new framework among Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. Military chiefs are developing mechanisms for cooperation. Turkey's defence exports continue to expand. Ankara is presenting regional ownership as an important principle. And Washington is openly examining the future scale of its military presence.

The Middle East is therefore not becoming a region without outside powers. It is becoming a region where outside powers and regional powers may operate through a more complicated mixture of alliances, partnerships and competing security arrangements.

Turkey wants to be at the centre of that new equation.

And as the United States considers how much of its decades-old military footprint it still needs, the question is no longer simply who will fill a vacuum. The more important question is what kind of regional order will emerge when no single external power is expected to carry as much of the security burden as before.

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